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While macroeconomic volatility in the US economy decreased since the early 1980's, in-
dividual earnings volatility and wage inequality increased. This paper argues that increasing
nancial development can contribute to both changes. I develop a real business cycle model
with sectoral productivity shocks and labor as well as credit market frictions. Credit market
frictions take the form of collateral-based credit constraints. It is shown that there are interac-
tions between the labor and the credit market that matter for the development of wages and
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aggregate output volatility is lower.
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11 Introduction
Since the early 1980's, the US experienced a decline in the volatility of real GDP
growth (Stock and Watson, 2002; Davis and Kahn, 2008). One possible explanation is
the increase in nancial development in the meaning of easier access to credit for rms
(Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel, 2006). Support for the positive link between macroe-
conomic stability and nancial development is given in the cross-country study of
Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002). There is however no evidence for higher stabil-
ity at the household level. Kambourov and Manovskii (2009) nd that individual
earnings volatility and earnings inequality increased since the 1970's. The increase
occurred especially within narrowly dened age-education subgroups. Figures 1 and
2 show the decline in the volatility of GDP growth as well as the increase in the
ratio of gross earnings at the top decile to those at the bottom decile, that have been
accompanied by an increase in the share of credit in GDP. The present paper argues
that an increase in nancial development can contribute to both changes: increas-
ing macroeconomic stability and increasing wage inequality within groups of similar
workers.
An increasing amount of theoretical work demonstrates the link between nan-
cial development, macroeconomic uctuations and growth. The models often dis-
pense with labor as a production input (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Kiyotaki, 1998;
Azariadis and Kaas, 2009) or they assume perfect mobility of labor (Aghion, Baner-
jee, and Piketty, 1999; Kiyotaki and Moore, 2008; Kocherlakota, 2009; Kaas, 2009).
However, labor reallocation has been identied as an important factor in explaining
macroeconomic variables (Lilien, 1982; Burgess and Mawson, 2003). Lagos (2006),
for example, shows in a model of frictional labor market and sectoral shocks how
labor market policies aect total factor productivity (TFP).
There are few papers that study the eect of nancial development on within-
group wage inequality. Jerzmanowski and Nabar (2011) nd empirical evidence for
a positive link between nancial development and within-group wage inequality in
the US. Their theoretical approach focuses on how nancial development leads to
organizational change, and thereby to higher wage inequality for skilled workers.
The objective of this paper is to explore the link between macroeconomic stability,
2Figure 1: Volatility and Credit:
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Data source: World Development Indicators (World
Bank).
Aggregate Volatility: Rolling standard deviation of GDP growth (annual %). Data source for GDP
growth: World Development Indicators.
volatility of individual earnings, and wage inequality when debt constraints slow
down capital reallocation and when workers are not perfectly mobile. It is shown
that looking at frictions in nancial markets and labor markets separately may be
misleading. There are important interactions between both markets. As a result,
the eectiveness of improvements in the credit market depend on the degree of labor
market frictions.
I develop a model with two sectors. Credit market frictions arise in the form
of collateral-based credit constraints as for example in Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Kiyotaki (1998), and Azariadis and Kaas (2009). I introduce a simple form of la-
bor market frictions: In each period only a given fraction of workers employed in
the low-wage sector can move into the high-wage sector. One can think of various
factors that make it dicult for a worker to switch sectors. Barriers may arise from
sector-specic skills or workers may have to move to another town if they want to
switch sectors. Wages within one sector are determined competitively. In the model,
3Figure 2: Wage Inequality and Credit:
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). Data source: World Development Indicators (World
Bank).
Decile 9/Decile 1. Data source: Decile ratios of gross earnings (OECD.Stat)
volatility is the result of sectoral productivity shocks. I do not consider aggregate
productivity shocks that would aect both sectors in the same way. One sector al-
ways produces at the technology frontier. If capital and labor were perfectly mobile,
all production factors would ow to the productive sector, and there would be no
volatility and no wage inequality. In addition, output and wage income would be
maximized. When capital market frictions are introduced, aggregate output depends
on the distribution of wealth between sectors. When nancial development increases,
the wealth distribution becomes less important and the volatility of aggregate output
decreases. When labor is mobile, each worker earns the same wage, which behaves
similar to aggregate output. Wage income increases in nancial development as more
capital is employed in the high-TFP sector, and wage volatility decreases in nancial
development. If, in addition, labor market frictions are introduced, wage inequality
can arise. Increasing nancial development now increases the correlation of wages
with sector-specic TFP, and thereby wage inequality and volatility of individual
4earnings.
A related strand of literature introduces capital market frictions into a search and
matching model of equilibrium unemployment (Wasmer and Weil, 2004; Petrosky-
Nadeau, 2009; Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer, 2010; Dromel, Kolakez, and Lehmann,
2010). While these papers explore the impact of credit market frictions on unem-
ployment in the presence of macroeconomic shocks, the present paper examines the
impact of credit market frictions on wage inequality in the presence of sector-specic
productivity shocks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model
environment. Equity returns, wages, and the sectoral distribution of wealth in equi-
librium are determined in Section 3. Section 4 explores the eect of nancial devel-
opment on volatility and inequality. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time economy with two labor markets or sectors indexed by
j = 1;2 and innitely-lived workers and entrepreneurs. There is one representative
worker household in the economy consisting of a continuum of workers. The worker
household does not save or borrow, but simply consumes its labor income each pe-
riod.1 The worker household assigns its members to the sectors in order to maximize
labor income. The labor market within one sector is competitive, but wages may
dier between sectors when labor is not perfectly mobile. Workers wish to move to
the sector with the highest wage. However, each period only up to a fraction  of
workers in the low-wage sector can move into the high-wage sector. The parameter 
captures stochastic costs of switching sectors. Each sector consists of a continuum of
entrepreneurs that can be represented by one rm in each sector. Entrepreneurs may
lend or borrow capital, hire workers, and produce. They derive logarithmic utility




where Et denotes expectations formed at date t,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor of
rms, and Cj
 is rm j's consumption at date . All rms produce the same homo-
1Workers may not borrow since they have no collateral. There is one big representative worker household that
insures its members against sectoral income shocks and that does not save. The assumption that workers do not
save is a common simplication in models with credit market frictions (e.g. Kocherlakota, 2009).













t denote labor and capital input in sector j. The good produced in
period t is used for next period's consumption and investment. There are two states






A if j = st
zA if j 6= st
with 0 < z < 1;
and with transition probabilities
(st+1jst) =
(
 2 (0:5;1) if st+1 = st
1    if st+1 6= st
:
Firms in one sector produce at the productivity frontier A, and rms in the other
sector have low TFP zA. Productivity states are positively autocorrelated. In the
following, the sector with high (low) TFP A (zA) is indexed by i = H (L).
Firms may borrow and lend at gross interest rate Rt. Let Di
t be the debt position
of rm i in period t. If rm i is a borrower, Di
t > 0. If rm i is a lender, Di
t < 0. Only
a fraction  2 [0;z
1
) of output is pledgeable collateral and rm i may only borrow




Rt . Firms observe the state of productivity
and decide based on that information whether to borrow or lend, and whether they
want to produce and hire workers. Firms collect prots out of production, redeem
debt or collect returns from saving.
3 Equilibrium
Firms choose consumption Ci
t, capital input Ki
t, labor input Li
t, and debt position
Di








































where the equity return Ri
t equals the interest rate Rt if rm i is a lender. The equity
return is given by ~ Rt  Rt if rm i is a borrower. Solving the maximization problem
























A market equilibrium is dened as a sequence of consumption plans, allocations




tg for each sector, con-
sumption for the workers fCw







for a given initial capital stock, and initial wealth and labor distribution
 the entrepreneurs' maximization problem (1) is solved
 as many workers as possible are allocated in the high-wage sector and workers






 the markets for output, labor, and capital clear.
Let Di
t = Dt > 0 if rm i is a borrower. Equilibrium in the credit market ensures
that Di
t =  Dt if rm i is a lender. Next period's aggregate capital stock equals
then
Kt+1 = Yt; (2)
where Yt denotes aggregate output. In the following, the total amount of labor





t . The market equilibrium depends on nancial
development () as well as on the degree of labor mobility (). Equilibrium wages,
equity returns, and the development of wealth are separately determined for the case
of perfect labor mobility, the case when labor is mobile to some degree, and the case
when labor is immobile between sectors.
3.1 Perfect Mobility of Labor:  = 1
Competitive wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor. As workers can
move freely between sectors, wages are the same in both sectors:



















 must hold. Suppose high-TFP rms are debt constrained.
Credit is then given by Dt =
Y H
t
Rt . Wealth of the productive (and credit constrained)

























denote the wealth share of the high-TFP rm. The interest rate is
determined as a function of xt and of the total capital stock Kt. One of three cases
can occur:
 Only high-TFP rms produce and debt constraints are binding
When low-TFP rms do not produce, and debt constraints are binding, the












As low-TFP rms lend all their equity to high-TFP rms in this case, the


























 1 denotes the marginal product of capital in sector
i.
 All rms produce and debt constraints are binding
The interest rate will not fall below the marginal product of capital of low-TFP












, xt < 1  

z1=:
In this case, both types of rms produce, and high-TFP rms are debt con-

















9 Only high-TFP rms produce and borrowers are not debt constrained
The interest rate will not exceed the marginal product of capital of high-TFP
rms. If the wealth share of high-TFP rms is large, borrowers are not debt




The equity return of the productive sector ~ Rt is then equal to the interest rate.












The following function sums up the above results and gives the interest rate for all
combinations of xt and Kt:
R(xt;Kt) =
8
> > > > > > > <





















t if xt  1   

: (6)
Next period's wealth share of the high-TFP rm is
xt+1 =
(
X0(xt) if the productivity state does not change
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if xt  1   
z1=
1   
 if xt 2 [1   
z1=;1   
]
xt if xt  1   

: (7)
The stochastic dynamics of borrower wealth depends on the collateral share , and
is similar to Proposition 4 in Azariadis and Kaas (2009) in which capital is the




to an equilibrium with ecient production, non-binding credit constraints and no





   < 
2 converge to a cycle with
ecient production. However credit constraints bind in a fraction 1    of periods.







1 converge to a cycle with a nite
number of states. Production is ecient only in three states. For a more detailed
description of the dynamics and for a proof, see Azariadis and Kaas (2009).
3.2 Labor is mobile to some degree: 0 <  < 1
Let bt be the fraction of workers in the high-TFP sector at the beginning of period t
before the new productivity state is drawn and before labor reallocation takes place.
After labor is reallocated, labor input in period t is LH
t = bt+1 in the high-TFP sector
and LL
t = 1 bt+1 in the low-TFP sector. In each period, only a fraction  of workers
in the low-wage sector can move to the high-wage sector.
If the labor market constraint does not bind, all workers earn the same wage
after labor reallocation. The distribution of workers between sectors for this case is



















When labor is not perfectly mobile, not all workers can leave the low-wage sector
11and both sectors produce. Wages do not only depend on sectoral TFP, but also on
the amount of capital and labor employed. Workers in the high-TFP sector usually
earn the highest wage. However, when labor is suciently scarce in the low-TFP
sector, workers in the low-TFP sector are paid the highest wage. Given xt and bt,
labor input in the high-TFP sector in period t is given by
bt+1 = B0(xt;bt) =
(
min(bt + (1   bt);Bnc(xt)) if Bnc(xt)  bt
max((1   )bt;Bnc(xt)) if Bnc(xt) < bt
(9)
if the productivity state remains the same, and by
bt+1 =
B1(xt;bt) = B0(xt;1   bt) =
(
min(1   bt + bt;Bnc(xt)) if Bnc(xt)  1   bt
max((1   )(1   bt);Bnc(xt)) if Bnc(xt) < 1   bt
if the productivity state changes.
When workers are not perfectly mobile, the high-TFP rm is not necessarily the
borrower. The productivity of capital within one sector increases in the amount of
labor employed. When labor is suciently immobile, it may happen that there is
so few labor in the high-TFP sector that the productivity of capital is higher in the
low-TFP sector, and the low-TFP rm borrows. A rm borrows capital as long as its
marginal productivity of capital exceeds the interest rate. It is shown in Appendix A









1  . The threshold increases in the fraction of labor employed in
the high-TFP sector, bt+1.






















12Since some workers stay in the low-TFP sector, both sectors produce and the
interest rate equals the marginal product of capital of low-TFP rms. When
borrower wealth is large enough, credit constraints are not binding, and the
interest rate equals also the marginal product of capital of high-TFP rms.2






zA(f (xt;bt+1)bt+1 + 1   bt+1)
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t and is derived in Appendix
























if the productivity state does not change. If the productivity state changes,
xt+1 = 1   X0(xt;bt+1).



















The interest rate equals the marginal product of capital of high-TFP rms.
When wealth of the low-TFP rm is suciently high, credit constraints are not
2The corresponding value of xt is derived in Appendix A.
13binding and the interest rate equals also the marginal product of capital of low-
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t .4 The transitional dynamics
of the wealth share of high-TFP rms is described by
X0(xt;bt+1) = Rtxt
Rtxt+ ~ Rt(1 xt) =
8
> > > <



























The values of bt and xt determine whether the high-TFP rm is a lender or a borrower
in period t, and which sector can attract workers. Figure 3 illustrates the thresholds
of xt as functions of bt indicating which case occurs when the productivity state does
not change. The threshold functions are derived in Appendix B. In the beginning
of period t, before labor is reallocated between sectors, a fraction bt of workers is
in the high-TFP sector, and the wealth share of high-TFP rms is given by xt =
X0(xt 1;bt). When (bt;xt) is located above the TB curve, the high-TFP rm has a
high wealth share and employs relatively few workers. It will therefore lend capital to
the low-TFP rm. Below the TB threshold, in contrast, the high-TFP rm borrows
capital. It is protable for a rm to borrow capital as long as its marginal productivity
3The corresponding value of xt is derived in Appendix A.































14exceeds the interest rate. When (bt;xt) is located in the area between the TRH and the
TRL curve, the borrower's wealth share is suciently large that credit constraints are
not binding. Marginal productivities of capital are equalized across sectors. Equity
returns are equalized as well. The wealth distribution does not change. When (bt;xt)
is located above the TRH curve, the interest rate equals MPKH
t and the wealth share
of the high-TFP sector decreases. Below the TRL curve, the interest rate equals
MPKL
t and the wealth share of the high-TFP sector increases.
Workers earn a wage equal to the marginal productivity of labor within their
sector. They wish to move to the sector with the highest wage. That is usually the
sector with higher TFP. However, when the wealth share in the high-TFP sector is
very low, workers in the low-TFP sector earn the highest wage. This occurs in the
area below the TWL curve. Workers move to the high-TFP (low-TFP) sector when
(bt;xt) is located above (below) the TL curve. Wages in both sectors are equalized
by labor reallocation, when (bt;xt) is located in the area between the TWH and the
TWL curve. Above the TWH curve wages in the high-TFP sector exceed wages in the
low-TFP sector.
The arrows in Figure 3 indicate whether x and/or b decrease or increase. When
the productivity state changes, the fraction of workers in the high-TFP sector before
labor reallocation is given by 1 bt, and the wealth share in the new high-TFP sector
is xt = 1   X0(xt 1;bt).
Assume the productivity state does not change for several periods. When a lot of
workers and only few capital is allocated in the high-TFP sector, workers will leave
and capital ows to the high-TFP sector. The wealth share increases and eventually
the sector can again attract workers. When there are only few workers and a lot
of capital in the high-TFP sector, workers will move to the high-TFP sector while
capital leaves. When the productivity state changes, the wealth share and labor
input in the new high-TFP sector is again located below the TRL threshold. When
nancial development is suciently high, (bt;xt) eventually stays in the area between
the TRH and the TRL curve where equity returns are equalized across sectors.
Proposition 1. If   
2, equity returns are equalized across sectors in the long run
for a given  2 (0;1].
15Figure 3: Dynamics when the productivity state remains the same (st = st 1). When st 6= st 1, bt
and X0(xt 1;bt) are replaced by 1   bt and 1   X0(xt 1;bt).
Appendix C contains the proof of Proposition 1. The critical value of  equals the
threshold 
comp
2 that holds in the case of perfect labor mobility.
3.3 Labor is immobile between sectors:  = 0
Consider now the case  = 0. Workers are stuck in their present sector. Each period
t, the fraction of workers employed in the high-TFP sector is either   0:5 or 1 .
The dynamics of the model become clear by inspection of Figures 4 and 5. The
horizontal axis displays now the labor input of high-TFP rms in period t, bt+1. The
threshold functions are derived in Appendix B. Assume that nancial development
is high, bt+1 equals , and xt falls between the TRH and the TRL threshold. When
productivity stays constant, next period's wealth share of the high-TFP sector as
well as its labor input remain the same. Otherwise, they equal 1    and 1   xt.






















When the new wealth share of high-TFP rms is also located in the area between
the TRH and the TRL threshold, this will also be the case in all following periods and
rms are not credit constrained. When it is located below the TRL line, the wealth
share of the high-TFP sector will approach the TRL line from below. The long run
dynamics are illustrated in Figure 4 by the double arrows. Note that the TRH curve
has the same curvature as the TRL curve. In the long run, x will never lie above
the TRH curve. This follows from concavity of both curves. Figure 5 displays the
dynamics for low nancial development.
Proposition 2.
























verge to a cycle with two states x2 = 1   x1 2 [TRL(1   );1   TRL(1   )].
17Equity returns are equalized across sectors in the long run and credit constraints
do not bind.
(b) Economies with small collateral  < im
C converge to a cycle with x 2 [1  
TRL();TRL(1   )] [ [1   TRL(1   );TRL()]. Capital ows to the high-TFP
sector and debt constraints are binding.
Appendix C contains the proof of Proposition 2.























This section examines the dynamics of the model for 0 <   1 by varying the value
of .5 The simulation is not meant to replicate real data, but to highlight the eects
of dierent degrees of capital and labor market imperfections on the development
of output and wages. The model period is one year.6 The discount factor is set
to  = 0:95. Let Y include output as well as undepreciated capital. Using this
interpretation, it is reasonable to choose a capital share  = 0:8 (Kaas, 2009). The
remaining parameters are set to A = 1, z = 0:9, and  = 0:6. The initial values of x
and b are 0:5 and 0:7. One obtains the thresholds 
comp




The variables of interest are determined by the sample means of
 aggregate output: Yt = Y H
t + Y L
t
 the share of credit in aggregate output: Dt=Yt
 the average wage: bt+1wH
t + (1   bt+1)wL
t
 wage inequality: wH
t =wL
t
The volatility of a variable is measured as its standard deviation over all periods.
The volatility of individual wages is calculated as the standard deviation of wages
within one sector.
The simulation results are illustrated in Figures 6 to 11. Since labor and capital are
complementary input factors, the eect of a policy improving the mobility of capital
depends on the mobility of labor. I simulated each series for three dierent degrees
of labor market frictions: low labor mobility ( = 0:1), high labor mobility ( = 0:9),
and perfect mobility of labor ( = 1). The simulation results show that increasing
nancial development has, in general, a higher eect when workers are more mobile.
Higher nancial development increases the share of credit in aggregate output (Figure
6). Recall that the credit share in GDP has been taken as a measure of nancial
development in the introductory section of this paper. Financial development has a
similar eect on aggregate output as it has on the average wage. Aggregate output
5The case when labor cannot move between sectors diers mainly in the threshold of  above which equity returns
are equalized.
6I simulated time series of 50,000 periods.
19Figure 6: The eect of nancial development on the share of credit in aggregate output for  = 0:1
(dotted line),  = 0:9 (dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
increases in nancial development (Figure 7). The volatility of aggregate output
decreases in nancial development (Figure 8). Financial development has a higher
potential eect on volatility when the labor market is more exible. Aggregate
volatility is zero only if neither the capital nor the labor market constraint binds.
Note, however, that for economies with poor nancial development, volatility is
higher when workers are more mobile. When capital mobility is low, in some periods,
a lot of capital is allocated in the low-TFP sector. Hence, the low-TFP sector
withdraws workers from the high-TFP sector and aggregate output is low. In other
periods, a lot of capital is allocated in the high-TFP sector and workers want to work
in the high-TFP sector. As a result, aggregate output is high. These uctuations are
amplied when worker mobility is increased. Wage inequality as well as the volatility
of individual earnings increase in nancial development when labor is not perfectly
mobile between sectors (Figures 9 and 10). When labor is assumed to be perfectly
mobile, each worker earns the same wage and the simulation shows that volatility of
wages decreases in nancial development. It is by the introduction of labor market
20frictions that a positive relationship between wage inequality, volatility of individual
earnings, and nancial development emerges.
Figure 7: The eect of nancial development on aggregate output for  = 0:1 (dotted line),  = 0:9
(dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
21Figure 8: The eect of nancial development on the volatility of aggregate output for  = 0:1
(dotted line),  = 0:9 (dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
Figure 9: The eect of nancial development on wage inequality for  = 0:1 (dotted line),  = 0:9
(dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
22Figure 10: The eect of nancial development on the volatility of individual wages for  = 0:1
(dotted line),  = 0:9 (dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
What is the intuition behind the results? Volatility in the model framework is
the result of sectoral productivity shocks. When there are no credit and no labor
market frictions, capital and labor always ow to the sector with high TFP. There
is no volatility, and no inequality. Labor income and output are maximized. When
capital market frictions are introduced, the sector with lower TFP also produces and
the distribution of wealth between the high and the low TFP sector matters. The
wealth distribution becomes less important when nancial development increases.
Increasing nancial development decreases the volatility of aggregate output and
of the single wage. When labor market frictions are introduced as well, it may
occur that not enough workers manage to move to the high-wage sector to equalize
marginal productivities of labor across sectors. Workers in one sector earn then lower
wages than workers in the other sector. If nancial development increases now, more
capital ows to the high-TFP sector. As a result, wages in the high-TFP sector
increase even more while wages in the low-TFP sector decrease even more. Wages
23are more correlated with sectoral TFP (Figure 11). Wage inequality and volatility
of individual earnings increase.
Figure 11: The eect of nancial development on the correlation of wages with sector-specic TFP
for  = 0:1 (dotted line),  = 0:9 (dashed line),  = 1 (solid line)
5 Conclusions
A real business cycle model with sectoral productivity shocks and labor as well
as credit market frictions can explain a simultaneous increase in macroeconomic
stability and in wage inequality. In line with other theoretical work on nancial
frictions, it was shown that nancial development has a positive eect on output
and macroeconomic stability. The main contribution of the present paper is to make
visible the interaction between the labor and the credit market. In the presence of
labor market frictions, an increase in nancial development increases the correlation
of wages with sector-specic TFP and thereby wage inequality, and volatility of
individual earnings.
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26APPENDIX
A Derivations
Derivation of equation (8)
The following derivation makes use of results obtained in Section 3.1. In a competitive
labor market, only high-TFP rms produce in period t if xt  1   
z
1
 . All workers




rms produce, the high-TFP rm borrows, and debt constraints are binding. As the



















(1   xt)    + xt
:
Threshold of xt below which high-TFP rms borrow
The high-TFP rm borrows as long as MPKH
t  MPKL



























































































t that solves equation (A.3).




t . The right-hand
side is increasing at a decreasing rate. Hence, f (xt;bt+1) is determined as the unique
solution of equation (A.2). The solution is illustrated in Figure 12.
Figure 12: Determination of f (xt;bt+1)
Critical value of borrower wealth above which credit constraints do not
bind for 0 <  < 1
There are two cases to distinguish:
28Case 1: The high-TFP rm borrows





















t = xtKt + Dt (A.7)






(1 xt)Kt Dt is increasing in Dt,
xtKt + Dt



























29Case 2: The low-TFP rm borrows





















t = (1   xt)Kt + Dt (A.13)






(1 xt)Kt+Dt is decreasing in Dt,
xtKt   Dt




















t and (A.12), one obtains
xt 










Thresholds when 0 <  < 1
The following calculations hold when the productivity state remains the same (st =
st 1).
30Worker reallocation and wages
 Workers want to move to the high-TFP sector in period t when bt  Bnc(xt)


















 Wages in the high-TFP sector exceed wages in the low-TFP sector if bt +(1 
















( + (1   )bt)
i  TWH(bt):



















 All workers earn the same wage if
TWL(bt)  xt  TWH(bt):
Borrowing
Using equations (9) and (A.1), one obtains the condition under which high-TFP
rms borrow. The conditions under which credit constraints are binding is derived
by substitution of (9) into (A.9) and (A.15).
 When wH
t > wL
t , the high-TFP sector borrows if
xt 
 + (1   )bt
 + (1   )









 + (1   )bt
 + (1   )
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When the low-TFP sector borrows, credit constraints bind if
xt >





 + (1   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When the low-TFP rm borrows, the credit constraint binds if
xt >















t , always high-TFP rms borrow. To see this, substitute equation

















Since the right-hand side is larger than 1, the condition that high-TFP rms
borrow is always fullled if wL
t = wH
t . Further, we know from Section 3.1 that
credit constraints bind in this case.7
7It was shown in Section 3.1 that credit constraints bind if both rms produce, Rt = MPKL
t , and wL
t = wH
t .
32Location of the threshold curves in (bt;xt) space
Proposition 3. When wL
t > wH
t , high-TFP rms borrow and credit constraints bind.
Proof. Simple algebra proves that the TLC curve and the THB curve are located above
the THC curve. It remains to show that the THC curve lies above the TWL curve for
all bt 2 (0;1). Since the TWL curve is convex and the THC curve is concave, and
since both curves are increasing and start at bt = 0 and xt = 0, it suces to show













































The condition is satised for 0 <  < 1 and  2 [0;z
1
). QED
Figure 13: Threshold functions for 0 <  < 1
It remains to show that TRH(bt) > TB(bt) > TRL(bt) > TWH(bt) > TL(bt) >
TWL(bt) for all bt 2 (0;1). Figure 13 illustrates the threshold functions and includes
33their corresponding values at bt = 0 and bt = 1. Since the TRL(bt) curve is increasing
and concave, and the TWH(bt) curve is increasing and convex, it suces to compare
both threshold functions at bt = 0 and bt = 1. It can be shown that TRL(0) > TWH(0)
if
 <













Since the right-hand side is larger than 1, TRL(0) > TWH(0) is always satised for
0 <  < 1. Further, it can be shown that TRL(1) > TWH(1). The relative location of
the other threshold functions is obtained by simple algebra.
Thresholds when  = 0

















i  TL(bt+1): (B.1)
Equation (B.1) is obtained from (8). The high-TFP rm borrows if (A.1) is satised:
xt 
bt+1

























Proof of Proposition 1
Step 1. Development of x
st = st 1:
1. If the high-TFP rm borrows, the transitional dynamics of the wealth share
of high-TFP rms is described by
xt = X0(xt 1;bt) =
~ Rt 1xt 1
~ Rt 1xt 1 + Rt 1(1   xt 1)
:
The wealth share of the high-TFP rm increases if
X0(xt 1;bt) > xt 1;
which is equivalent to ~ Rt 1 > Rt 1. This condition holds if the high-TFP
rm is credit constrained, i.e. if (bt;xt) is located below the TRL curve.
2. If the low-TFP rm borrows, the transitional dynamics of the wealth share
of high-TFP rms is described by
xt = X0(xt 1;bt) =
Rt 1xt 1
Rt 1xt 1 + ~ Rt 1(1   xt 1)
:
The wealth share of the high-TFP rm decreases if
X0(xt 1;bt) < xt 1;
which is equivalent to ~ Rt 1 > Rt 1. This condition holds if the low-TFP
rm is credit constrained, i.e. if (bt;xt) is located above the TRH curve.
3. It follows that the wealth distribution does not change if (bt;xt) is located
in the area between the TRL and the TRH curve.
If st 6= st 1, the wealth share of high-TFP rms at the end of period t   1 is
given by 1   X0(xt 1;bt).
35Step 2. The functions TRL(bt) and TRH(bt) are monotonously increasing in bt and












 + (1   )





It follows that (bt;xt) stays in the area between the TRL and the TRH curve if the
following conditions are true:
Condition 1: TRL(1)  0:5
Condition 2: TRH(0)  0:5
Using TRL(1) =  














, Condition 2 is satised if
 + (2   )(1   )z
1
1   0:
If Condition 1 is satised,   
2. This also ensures that Condition 2 is satised.
Hence,   
2 is a sucient condition that (bt;xt) stays in the area between the
TRL and the TRH curve in the long run. QED
Proof of Proposition 2
The inspection of Figures 14 and 15 already suggests that two cases have to be
considered. For reasons of clarity let a, e, c, and d denote the line segments between
points (1   ;TRH(1   )) and (1   ;1), (;TRH()) and (;1), (1   ;0) and
(1   ;TRL(1   )), as well as (;0) and (;TRL()), respectively. The length of a
line segment is denoted by the symbol kk. Since the TRH and TRL threshold functions
have the same derivatives, and since they are increasing and concave, kak < kdk and
kek < kck.
36Figure 14: Case 1: TRL()  1   TRL(1   )
Figure 15: Case 2: TRL() > 1   TRL(1   )
37Case 1. TRL()  1   TRL(1   )
1. Suppose (xt;bt+1) is located on a in Figure 14. As long as the productivity
state does not change, the economy converges to TRH(1   ). When the
productivity state changes, the new value of (xt;bt+1) is located on d. Since
kak < kdk, the economy eventually converges to TRL() and then uctuates
between two states x1 = TRL() and x2 = 1   TRL().
2. Suppose (xt;bt+1) is located on e. As long as the productivity state does
not change, the economy converges to TRH(). When the productivity state
changes, the new value of (xt;bt+1) is located on c. Since kek < kck, the
economy eventually converges to TRL(1   ) and then uctuates between
two states x1 = TRL(1   ) and x2 = 1   TRL(1   ).
Case 2. TRL() > 1   TRL(1   )
1. Suppose (xt;bt+1) is located on a. As long as the productivity state does
not change, the economy converges to TRH(1   ). When the productivity
state changes, the new values of (xt;bt+1) are located on d. Since kak < kdk,
the economy eventually converges to TRL(). When the productivity state
changes then, the new value of (xt;bt+1) is located on c and xt = 1 TRL().
The economy converges to TRL(1 ) as long as the productivity state does
not change. When the productivity state changes then, the new value of
(xt;bt+1) is located on d and xt = 1   TRL(1   ). The economy converges
to a cycle with x 2 [1   TRL();TRL(1   )] [ [1   TRL(1   );TRL()].
2. Suppose (xt;bt+1) is located on e. As long as the productivity state does
not change, the economy converges to TRH(). When the productivity state
changes, the new value of (xt;bt+1) is located on c. Since kek < kck, the
economy again converges to a cycle with x 2 [1 TRL();TRL(1 )][[1 
TRL(1   );TRL()].
Hence, if and only if the condition TRL()  1 TRL(1 ) is satised, the economy
converges to a cycle with two states x2 = 1 x1 2 [TRL(1 );1 TRL(1 )]. This
is equivalent to  
(1 )

1 z
2
1 

2

1 z
1
1 

 22

1 z
1
1 

+z
1
1 
. QED
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